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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MAX HUNSAKER, KATHLEEN
HUNSAKER, SUSIE M. HUNSAKER
and RHEA H. BEVERLY,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
THE STATE OF UTAH, by and through
its Road Commission and POLLARD
INCORPORATED, a Utah Corporation,
Defendants-Respondents.

Case No.

12854

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
Suit by grocer to enjoin widening of highway into area
used for customer parking, without condemnation proceedings, and to quiet title to the disputed area against
claims by Highway Department that said area had been
dedicated and abandoned for highway purposes.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
District Court held that disputed area had been dedicated and abandoned to highway purposes and dismissed
Plaintiffs' complaint.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seek an order declaring that their property
has not been dedicated and abandoned to highway pur-
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poses, requiring the road commission to condemn if they
are to use it for a highway, or in the alternative for a new ·
trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs are owners of real property at 5300 West
3500 South, Hunter, Utah (R. 69), the North 16.5 feet of
which is occupied by the asphalted South lane of a two
lane street known as 3500 South Street. The disputed
strip of land, which is 16.5 feet wide, lies South of that
asphalted traffic lane and North of Plaintiffs' grocery and
has been used for many years for gasoline pumps and for
parking of Plaintiffs' customers and suppliers. Defendants
attempted to widen 3500 South into a 4 lane highway using the disputed strip for an additional lane of traffic and
this action was commenced to enjoin taking of the disputed strip without condemnation and to quiet title to
that strip in the name of Plaintiffs. Unless the Road
Commission can establish that the disputed strip has been
dedicated and abandoned to the public for highway purposes within the meaning of 27-12-89, UCA, 1953, the
Highway Department has no claim to that strip. Accordingly the sole issue involved in this case is whether or not
such a dedication and abandonment has occurred. The
following is a brief history of Plaintiffs' property.
The center of 3500 South Street is also the section line.
The earliest record produced at the trial was a center line
survey made in 1856 (R. 44-46) which fails to state the
width of the highway. The Revised Laws of 1898, Sec.
111 (R. 50) established the width of public highways at
66 feet, but expressly states that it should not be con-
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strued to increase or diminish the width of established
highways. Since the highway in question had already
been established its width was not altered by that statute.
The patent was issued to Plaintiffs' predecessors in interet in 1908 subject to "easement or right of way of the
public to use all such highways as may have been established according to law, over the same or any part thereof" (R. 69, Par. 6, Ex. 18P, Page 6). The Revised Laws
of 1898, Sec. 1122 imposed a duty upon the County Commissioners to prepare and file plats showing descriptions
of existing public highways (R. 51), however no such plat
could be found and none was produced at the trial.
The first hard surface highway on 3500 South was a
20 foot wide concrete highway constructed about 1915
(R. 129), the South 10 feet of which occupied the North
10 feet of Plaintiffs' property (R. 38). About 1956 the 20
foot concrete highway was widened to 33 feet and covered
with asphalt (R. 9), 16.5 feet of which occupied the North
16.5 feet of Plaintiffs' property. The business buildings
used by Plaintiffs as a grocery store were originally constructed in the early 1920's as a service station (R. 130),
and gasoline pumps were installed in the disputed strip of
land (R. 130, 133, see also photographs exhibits lP, and
7P). Those gas pumps were removed about 1956 and the
disputed area was blacktopped by Plaintiffs about 1963
to provide additional parking area for store customers and
suppliers (R. 103, 105). No fences were ever installed
between the highway and the Plaintiffs' property so far
as the record discloses (R. 135), although fences installed
on property adjacent to the Plaintiffs' property were
approximately 33 feet South of the center of the high-
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way and had been there for many years (R. 69, Par. 3,
R. 134). The Court found that Plaintiffs' predecessor in
interest recognized in a deed executed in 1957 that the
highway was 33 feet wide (R. 69, Par. 7, Ex. 18P, page
82), however that deed pertains to a 26 ft. driveway area
West of the land involved in his dispute as shown by the
plat in the back of the abstract (Ex. 18P). No statement
as to the width of 3500 South exists in the chain of title
to the property in dispute in this case which is the smaller
tract upon which the grocery store is located (Ex. 18P).
Neither the real estate contracts of 1948 (Ex. 17P) and
1961 (Ex. 37-D) or the other transactions shown in the
abstract (Ex. 18P) state the width of 3500 South Street.
The Court also found (R. 70, par. 8) that Plaintiffs' mortgage given in February, 1971 (Ex. 38D), describes the
highway right of way as including the North 33 feet of
Plaintiffs' land. Plaintiffs acknowledge that this is true,
however that mortgage appears to have been prepared by
a lending institution, does not constitute a conveyance to
the State of Utah, and is less than 10 years prior to the
date of the lawsuit so the Road Commission cannot contend that it has acquired rights under 27-12-89, UCA,
1953, which requires dedication and abandonment for 10
years.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE STATE OF UTAH FAILED TO SUSTAIN IT'S
BURDEN OF PROVING THAT PLAINTIFFS HAD
DEDICATED AND ABANDONED THE DISPUTED
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PROPERTY TO HIGHWAY PURPOSES BY PERMITTING PUBLIC USE FOR 10 YEARS.
Plaintiffs are the record owners of the disputed strip
of property lying between the asphalt highway and Plaintiffs' store. If The State of Utah has a right of way across
that land for highway purposes it must have been acquired by public use as provided by 27-12-89, UCA, 1953,
which reads as follows:
"A highway shall be deemed to have been dedicated
and abandoned to the UEe of the public when it has
been continuously used "s a r:ublic thoroughfare for
a period of ten years."
The burden of proving that property has been dedicated to public use is upon the State of Utah. Bonner v.
Sudbury, 18 U2d 140, 417 P.2d 646. Dedication of one's
property to public use should net be regarded lightly.
The presumption is in favor of the property owner and
the burden of establishing public use for the required
period of time is on those claiming it. Bonner v. Sudbury,
Supra. Dedication of private property to public use must
be proven by clear and convincing evidence, Petersen v.
Combe, 438 P.2d 545, 20 U.2d 376.
The Findings of Fact (R. 69-70) and evidence adduced
at the trial are insufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Plaintiffs or their predecessors in
interest ever "dedicated" or "abandoned" the property in
question, or that the disputed property was in fact used by
the public for highway purposes. The undisputed evidence indicates that before the road was hard surfaced
in about 1915 it was a gravel road used primarily by
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wagons, horses, buggies and surreys (R. 124) and that
it remained a 20 ft. concrete highway, 10 ft. of which was
(on Plaintiffs' property), until it was widened in 1956 to
a 33 ft. highway (16.5 feet of which was on Plaintiffs'
property) (R. 19). There is no evidence whatever of any
use being made of any additional portion of Plaintiffs'
property for highway purposes. The argument that because other persons in the area had fences situated approximately 33 feet south of the center of the street may
be evidence of their abandonment and dedication of their
land to highway purposes, but is not evidence as to such
an abandonment or dedication by Plaintiffs or their predessors in title. On the contrary, the evidence clearly shows
that since the advent of the automobile that the disputed
tract of land has been used by Plaintiffs and their predecessors in interest for business purposes such as an area
where automobiles parked while being serviced with gasoline, etc. and as a parking lot for the business building
situated upon Plaintiffs' property. (R. 38, 129, 130, 103,
105, 135) The absence of a fence in front of the Plaintiffs'
property, together with continued use of that property
shows an absence of an intent to dedicate and abandon
the disputed property to highway purposes.
Plaintiffs are entitled to a decree quieting title to the
disputed property since the State Road Commission failed
to establish by clear and convincing proof that it has
aquired a right of way over Plaintiffs' property.
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POINT II
THE RIGHTS ACQUIRED BY UTAH ROAD COMMISSION ARE LIMITED TO THOSE RIGHTS "DEDICATED" AND "ABANDONED" BY PLAINTIFFS AND
THEIR PREDECESSORS IN TITLE.
The controlling statute (27-12-89, UCA, 1953) speaks
of a property owner being deemed. to have "dedicated"
and "abandoned" his property "to the use of the public"
when it has been "continuously" used as a "public thoroughfare" for a period of 10 years. "Dedication" of land
for highway may be either express, as where owner manifests his purpose by grant evi:lenced by a writing, or implied, as where acts and conduct of owner clearly manifest his intention to devote land. to public use. Schlettler
v. Lynch, 23 U. 305, 64 P. 955. Ln effective dedication
requires an intention, express or implied, to dedicate,
and manifestation of some form of acceptance within a
reasonable time. Brown v. Oregon Short Line R. Co.,
36 U. 257, 102 P. 740. Acceptance is implied as a matter
of law where it has been used for longer than ten years.
Lindsay Land & Live Stock Co. v. Churnos, 75 U. 284,
285 P. 646.
Our case differs substantially from Burroughs v. Guest,
135 U. 91, 12 P. 847 (1896) Whitesides v. Greene (1896),
13 U. 341, 44 P. 1032, Lindsey Land and Livestock Company v. Churnos, 75 U. 384, 285 P. 646, and the Jeremy
case, supra and Deseret Livestock Company, 1234, 353,
259 P.2d 607, relied heavily upon by Defendants (R. 39)
since in our case, unlike those cases, there is other sub-

8
tantial evidence that Plaintiffs and their predecessors
dedicated only 16Y2 feet to highway purposes, and actually retained the right to use the other (disputed) 1612
feet for customer arking. Had Plaintiffs executed a deed
to the State of Utah for highway purposes and in that
deed retained the right to use the 1612 feet between the
store building and the asphalt highway for parking purposes the matter would be clear and The State would have
no right to establish a lane of traffic through that parking
lot without compensation to Plaintiffs. In our case, however, the grant (dedication) to the State of Utah is implied. by the acts of the parties. Schlettler v. Lynch, Supra
and Brown v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., Supra. The extent of the rights surrendered by Plaintiff and acquired
by the State of Utah are measured according to the intent
of the Plaintiffs as shown by their acts and conduct. The
undisputed evidence shows that Plaintiffs and their predecessors in interest always retained and used the disputed
land for service station and parking lot purposes in connection with their adjoining business. (R. 103, 105, 130,
133). There is no evidence that Plaintiffs or their predecessors in interest ever intended to "dedicate" or "abandon" the disputed strip of land. The burden is upon the
State of Utah to prove by clear and convincing evidence
as shown by the acts and deeds of Plaintiffs and their
predecessors in interest that the disputed strip of land was
in fact "dedicated" and "abandoned" to public use. Peterson v. Combe, Supra. Defendant's evidence falls far short
of that burden of proof and accordingly fails.
Counsel for Defendants quotes extensively from Whitesides v. Greene, Supra, Burrows v. Guest, Supra, and
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Jeremy v. Bertagnole, Supra, (R. 39-41) in support of the
proposition adopted by the Court (R. 69-70) to the effect
that circumstances to be considered in determining the
width of the highway include such things as (1) width
of the highways in the vicinity of the land in question,
and of the highway system, (2) the position of fences in
the area, (3) recognition of width of road by owners of
land in question, and ( 4) that once a particular use such
as automobile traffic has been established, such width
should be decreed by the court as will make such use convenient and safe for automobile traffic. (R. 39-41).
Plaintiffs agree that the matters mentioned are important and are helpful in deciding the width of a highway in a case such as Whitesides v. Greene, Supra, " ...
where there is no other evidence of dedication ... " and
where the disputed land was on the highway side of the
landowner's fence, or as in Burrows v. Guest, Supra,
where a plat had been filed for 30 years showing the
width of the highway in question, which plat had been
accepted and adopted by the owner, or where as in
Jeremy v. Bertagnole, Supra, they were dealing with
unfenced range lands. The basic inquiry to determine
the width of the road in each case was to determine the
intent of the land owner by considering what he did and
by considering all surrounding circumstances, including
the apparent public purpose and user. In our case it is
clear that Plaintifffs did not intend to surrender their
right to use the disputed strip of land as a parking lot,
and it is also clear that the public user of the adjacent
l6Y2 feet was for a two lane asphalt highway for automobile traffic. he state now seeks to double the size and to
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construct a four lane highway by using Plaintiffs parking
lot for the additional traffic lane. If that is permitted on
the basis of the need of the public for a four lane highway what is to preclude the state from saying next year
that they need a six lane highway and from building it
over additional land of Plaintiffs without compensation.
Certainly adequate roads are needed and should be built,
but the cost of those roads should be shared equally
among the public by using the tax money to acquire
property. Plaintiffs should not be required to give their
property to the state for a highway without compensation. Without the parking lot the grocery business cannot
function and Plaintiffs' business is wholly destroyed.
CONCLUSION
The State Road Commission has the burden of proving
by clear and convincing evidence that the disputed strip
of land has in fact been "dedicated" and "abandoned" to
public use as a "public thoroughfare" for ten years. Their
evidence at most establishes (1) that fence lines in the
area allow for a 66 foot road but there is no evidence that
Plaintiffs' property was ever fenced; (2) that the usual
width of highways in the area is 66 feet; (3) that a highway of unknown width existed when the patent to the
land was given, which patent was subject to existing
highway rights of way; ( 4) that some adjacent property
deeded to Plaintiffs in 1957 described the roadway as
including 33 feet of that property; and (5) that a mortgage was given by Plaintiffs in 1971 also recite the roadway as including 33 feet of Plaintiffs' property (R. 69-
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70). That evidence, at most, creates an inference that
Plaintiffs or their predecessors in interest may have
"dedicated" or "abandoned" 33 feet of their property to
highway purposes, and probably does not meet the "clear
and convincing" evidence burden of proof imposed upon
Defendant, and when considered in light of evidence that
the South l6Y2 feet of the claimed 33 feet have always
been used for service station and parking lot purposes by
Plaintiffs, the evidence falls far short of proving an intent
to "dedicate" or "abandon" that disputed strip of land.
The purpose for which a portion of the land was in fact
"dedicated" and "abandoned" by use was to permit the
establishment of a two lane highway, not the four lane
highway sought by Defendants. The State of Utah received no more rights than were
by the acts
and conduct of Plaintiffs and thei:..· predecessors in interest, which rights did not include the right to exclude
Plaintiffs and their customers Lorn their parking lot
without compensation.
The judgment of the District Court should be reversed
and title to the disputed strip should be quieted in Plaintiffs, or in the alternative a new trial should be granted.
Respectfully submitted

RONALD C. BARKER

